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Abstract
Emergent economic development policies reflect the challenges urban growth coalitions face in attracting the footloose
tech-entrepreneurs of the global economy. This convergence between the focus on place and the harnessing of global
capital has led to the proliferation of innovation-igniting urban developments (IIUD)—place-based economic development
strategies to boost the local knowledge economy. Economic developers are using IIUD strategies to convert areas of the city
into entrepreneurial “launch pads” for innovation. However, because these developments remain young, considerations
to implement IIUDs lack an evidence-base to show the potential for negative consequences on the communities where
they are embedded. This research addresses this gap through: 1) a review of studies of similar developments to identify
negative consequences; and 2) using a quasi-experimental method composed of Propensity Score Matching and Average
Treatment Effect analyses from IIUDs in three US cities (Boston, MA, St. Louis, MO, and Buffalo, NY). Combined, results
demonstrate that the greatest implications of IIUDs are the increased polarized division of labor, housing unaffordability,
and income inequality. As IIUDs gain in popularity, it is critical to correlate negative consequences with IIUDs to inform
economic developers in assessing trade-offs.
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1. Introduction
Policymakers and economic developers continually
search for tools to transition post-industrial and lag-
ging economies into knowledge economies (Bell, 1976;
Porat & Rubin, 1977; Yigitcanlar, O’connor, &Westerman,
2008). This is evident from the influx in place-based po-
lices aimed at concentrating the knowledge economy
in the city. Despite the differences in their names and
constitution (i.e., the university park captures research
spillovers, the innovation district may not include the
presence of a university, the creative district may target
creative, as well as tech workers), one commonality that
binds these developments is the focus on place (Drucker,
Kayanan, & Renski, 2019; Zandiatashbar &Hamidi, 2018).
While there exists a wide-ranging body of scholarship on
the role of place in increasing the attractiveness and
value of the city, much of which draws connections be-
tween the City Beautiful Movement (Hall, 2004), urban
renewal (Page & Ross, 2017), tactical urbanism (Lydon &
Garcia, 2015), and placemaking practices (Fincher, Pardy,
& Shaw, 2016), the contribution of this article is in draw-
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ing the connection between the role of place in local
economic development practices focused on siting inno-
vative activity in the city.
In an effort to attract the firms, talent, and sup-
ports considered necessary for innovation, innovation-
igniting urban developments (IIUD), as we label them in
this article, are rapidly budding up in cities across the
globe (Hamidi & Zandiatashbar, 2019a; Shearmur, 2012).
IIUDs, which are often developed over post-industrial
sites—such as Boston’s Seaport Innovation District in
the South Boston Waterfront (Drucker et al., 2019) or
22@BCN built over Barcelona’s Poblenou neighborhood
(Charnock & Ribera-Fumaz, 2011)—rely on amaster plan
for the designated area of development. These sites de-
pend heavily on design and placemaking to create an en-
trepreneurial ecosystem attractive to the firms and in-
dividuals closely associated with startup activities and
the technology sector (Acs, Stam, Audretsch,&O’Connor,
2017; Rossi & Di Bella, 2017). IIUD best practices and ac-
companying rhetoric suggest that design and placemak-
ing are necessary factors to foster a vibrant and engag-
ing environment conducive to the constant and spon-
taneous interaction integral to innovation (Chesbrough,
Vanhaverbeke, & West, 2006). Innovation districts are
a good example of IIUDs, as are extensions of college
campuses, such as Cortex Innovation Community in Saint
Louis, MO, and Buffalo’s Niagara Medical Campus in
Buffalo, NY (Drucker et al., 2019).
As the building of IIUDs trends, it becomes necessary
to consider potential negative consequences and associ-
ated policy solutions (Peck, 2005; Scott, 2006). However,
IIUDs are young developments and this challenges the
ability to derive a concrete evidence-base of negative
consequences.We address this through amixed-method
approach that incorporates: 1) a synthesis review of the-
oretical and empirical works explaining potential nega-
tive consequences and counter-empirical studies testing
such consequences; and 2) a quasi-experimental analy-
sis of empirical cases composed of Propensity Score
Matching (PSM) and Average Treatment Effect (ATE)
analyses from three prominent cases in the United
States (Boston’s Seaport Innovation District, MA, Cortex
Innovation Community in Saint Louis, MO, and Buffalo
Niagara Medical Campus [BNMC] in Buffalo, NY). Results
show that IIUDs correlate strongly with a polarized labor
division and issues of housing unaffordability.
This article is structured in four parts. The first part
details the structural factors contributing to IIUDs. The
second part uses examples of existing IIUDs to discuss
four prominent negative consequences of these emer-
gent spatial forms. The third section includes empiri-
cal findings from IIUDs in Boston, St. Louis, and Buffalo.
The final section points to policy suggestions that can be
used by urban development actors to mitigate the neg-
ative consequences of a continuing (and growing) trend
in IIUDs that our empirical analyses confirmed.
2. Urban Development and the Siting of
Innovation-Related Activity in the City
Over the last thirty years cities have undergone the
resurgence of property-led regeneration programs
(Turok, 1992). These developments have taken various
forms and have targeted different sectors, for exam-
ple, tourism (Smyth, 2005), waterfront development
(Fainstein, 2008), arts (García, 2004), sports (Hall 2004),
and of interest to this article, knowledge-based urban
developments (Carrillo, Yigitcanlar, García, & Lönnqvist,
2014). The process of regenerating cities and making
them more knowledge-intensive has contributed to pol-
icy prescriptions aimed at attracting young talented
workers (Florida, 2002). The 2008 Global Financial Crisis
and ensuing recession intensified the financialization of
the urban property market (Aalbers, 2020) and placed
increased emphasis on IIUDs to restart the economy,
which has contributed to economic developers more di-
rectly engaging with placemaking principles (Kayanan,
Eichenmüller, & Chambers, 2018). From the perspec-
tive of an evolving economic development practice, we
identify three structural changes that contribute to the
contemporary focus on place.
2.1. State Descaling
The first factor contributing to economic developers’
contemporary focus on place is the descaling of the
state (Harvey, 1989). Though not directly tied to the-
ories on the practice of economic development, a
wide scholarship exists on how descaling impacts the
(re)development of the city and its governance. As a po-
litical objective, descaling has created pathways for pri-
vate capital to interject in urban development (Harvey,
1989). Descaling imperatives do not necessarily come
with financial supports, meaning that local governments
are often left to scramble for financial resources, such as
public private partnerships (Fainstein, 2001) or tax incre-
ment finance schemes (Weber, 2014). This formof collab-
oration is evident in innovation district strategies, which
brings together a wide range of actors—to include repre-
sentatives from the private, public, education, and civic
spheres—working together to bring the innovation dis-
trict to fruition (B. Katz & Bradley, 2013).
2.2. Economic Developers’ Engagement with Science
and Technology Policies
The second factor in a changing economic development
practice more closely tied to place is economic devel-
opers engaging with science and technology policies.
Prior to the 1980s, rarely did state economic develop-
ment agencies focus on science and technology poli-
cies (Plosila, 2004). Within the urban realm in the west-
ern world, economic developers’ engagement with in-
dustrial districts through to the 1980s existed at the
state level and primarily consisted in the form of building
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factories (Plosila, 2004). Increasing linkages with higher
education and research institutions and discussing the
role of talent and venture capital as economic develop-
ment packages, activities related to supporting science
and technology, came only in the 1980s after the suc-
cess of planned science and research parks in Boston
(Route 128), Silicon Valley (Stanford Research Park), and
North Carolina (Research Triangle Park) were taking ef-
fect (Markusen, 1999; Saxenian, 1996). With the descal-
ing of the state, economic developers, now working at
the regional level, built upon the agglomeration bene-
fits of the industrial districts (Marshall, 1890) to focus
on clustering research and development activity (Fallah,
Partridge, & Rickman, 2013). The onset of neoliberalism
and entrepreneurial urban development (Harvey, 1989),
opened up the need for city-regions to play a heavier
hand in driving tech-based visions (Clark, 2014).
2.3. Urbanizing the Economy
The third factor contributing to local economic develop-
ers’ engagement with place is the focus on the city—in
both theory and in practice—as a generator of regional
wealth and competitiveness (Glaeser, 2011). Evidence
of this are calls by think tanks for the development
of metropolitan-scale governance through the imple-
mentation of metropolitan mayors (B. Katz & Bradley,
2013), as well as the (OECD, 2015) encouraging policy
prescriptions and spatial configurations that center eco-
nomic activity within themetropolitan sphere (D’Albergo
& Lefèvre, 2018; Kayanan, Moore-Cherry, & Tomaney,
2020). As discussed above, the shift from building IIUDs
on suburban greenfield sites and pastoral environments
to siting them in the city (Mozingo, 2016) add further sup-
ports to urbanizing the economy. For clarity on the con-
nection between the urbanization of the economy and
IIUDs, below we isolate two reasons that directly corre-
late with policies targeting innovative activity in the city:
agglomeration logics and demographic preferences.
2.3.1. Agglomeration
The siting of innovation-related activity in the city is un-
dergirded by agglomeration logics. Scholarship on ag-
glomeration supports the idea that spatial clustering
leads to specialization externalities of agglomeration
by catalyzing spillover effects such as frequent knowl-
edge exchange between similar industries, lower ac-
cess cost to the larger labor pool and suppliers, and
ultimately the product’s value chain (Shearmur, 2012).
Several empirical studies also confirm that such external-
ities of the agglomeration economy determine location
patterns and innovation productivities of knowledge-
based businesses. Building on this hypothesis, Boschma
(2005) stated that the spatial proximity leading to knowl-
edge spillover could be more effective when coupled
with cognitive proximity. Cognitive proximity refers to
the required knowledge similarity for intra- and inter-
firm knowledge transfers and highly depends on an in-
dividual’s level of knowledge, or in the aggregate, a
knowledgeable workforce. A recent study of Canadian
knowledge-based firms also shows that proximity to
a larger pool of talented workers and university grad-
uates play a critical role in their location pattern
(Shearmur, 2012).
2.3.2. Demographic Preferences
The principle pillar of the placemaking strategies in IIUD
policies is the local place-based characteristics that sat-
isfy the life quality of skillful millennials, such as their car-
free lifestyle and strong desire for urban social life,mixed-
use and compact neighborhoods, transit quality, and
walkable proximity to restaurants, retail, cultural, and
educational institutions (Florida, 2002; Shearmur, 2012;
Zandiatashbar, Hamidi, Foster, & Park, 2019). For in-
stance, transportation infrastructure is often integrated
in these policies as walkability and access to public tran-
sit are key characteristics of IIUDs (B. Katz & Bradley,
2013). Several European, American and Asian empiri-
cal studies show that college-educated millennials and
members of the creative class have become more car-
free and are more drawn to neighborhoods with walk-
ing and transit access to job and place-quality ameni-
ties (Credit, 2017; Weissmann, 2012; Zandiatashbar &
Hamidi, 2018). On the other hand, public transit infras-
tructure reduces travel time and enhances the urbaniza-
tion externalities of agglomeration by expanding the cov-
erage area of a business. Furthermore, transit riders have
more opportunities for face-to-face encounters leading
to knowledge exchange (Chatman & Noland, 2011).
3. Method
Our discussion on the negative consequences of the
IIUDs is built upon a mixed method of synthesis review
and empirical analysis. First, we provide a summary of a
pair-wise synthesis review of the theoretical and empiri-
cal works on each of the negative consequences. Second,
as IIUDs are still young, resulting in a lack of empirical
studies, we also include a series of analysis of three cases
in the US: the Seaport Innovation District, in Boston, MA;
Cortex Innovation Community (Cortex), in St. Louis, MO;
and BNMC in Buffalo, NY. Figures 1–3 briefly summarize
the location and history of each city’s respective IIUD.
4. IIUDs and Their Negative Consequences—Synthesis
Review
Having arrived at a theoretical understanding of why lo-
cal economic developers engage with place and a con-
textual understanding behind IIUDs, we now shift our at-
tention to the negative consequences that emerge from
such place-based strategies. It is important to note that
these negative consequences are not listed in chrono-
logical order. In addition, there is no guarantee that
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Figure 1. Boston Seaport Innovation Districts (BSID; Boston, MA). In 2010 Mayor Menino declared intentions to build
the Boston’s Seaport Innovation District. A master plan for the northernmost part of the peninsula was developed to
tighten the connection between igniting innovation and placemaking. Only a few developments existed in the area prior.
Incubators, free wi-fi connected spaces, and dorm-like housing for entrepreneurs formed the strategy. Boston’s IIUD strat-
egy focused on startup and tech-entrepreneurship but remained sector agnostic (Drucker et al., 2019). Image source:
Hamidi and Zandiatashbar (2019b).
Figure 2. Cortex Innovation Community (Cortex; Saint Louis,MO). As a legal entity, Cortexwas established in 2002 following
a series of attempts to create a research corridor between St. Louis University, Washington University, and BJC Healthcare
research medical center. In 2010, Cortex was reimagined as an innovation district and renamed the Cortex Innovation
Community. Incubators, hospital and university anchors, boutique hotels, and open spaces for quick wi-fi connectivity are
all located within the designated space (Drucker et al., 2019). Image source: Hamidi and Zandiatashbar (2019b).
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Figure 3. Buffalo Niagara Medical Campus (BNMC; Buffalo, NY). The BNMC is a medical innovation district established in
2002 in Buffalo, NY. It includes a medical campus, new hospitals, private-sector companies, and social innovators. Place-
making efforts in the form of street renovations and expansion of clinical, research, office, medical, and coworking spaces
formed the strategy (Hamidi & Zandiatashbar, 2019b). Image source: Hamidi and Zandiatashbar (2019b).
one IIUD will exhibit all four negative consequences.
However, based on an analysis of the existing literature
of knowledge-intensive developments across the globe,
below we list the most common negative consequences.
Although the empirical studies did not focus on urban
developments, we strengthened our argument by includ-
ing empirical analyses of three cases of IIUDs in the US.
Table 1 provides a matrix of the negative consequences
reported from our literature synthesis. The matrix sepa-
rates theoretical works from empirical studies for each
negative consequence.
4.1. Negative Consequence 1: Polarized Labor Division
IIUDs promote high-tech clusters and are primarily de-
pendent on two classes of the labor force: low-wage,
unskilled workers (Rifkin, 1995) and high-skilled profes-
sionals (Florida, 2002). Policies that support the devel-
opment of IIUD devote more focus on high-skilled pro-
fessionals. Because these individuals are critical to high-
tech growth, ample literature has addressed their life-
quality amenities (Florida, 2014). This prioritizing of the
high-skilled professional class in both the literature, in
policy, and in practice often means that low-wage, un-
skilled workers are disregarded. When IIUDs do address
job opportunities for these individuals it is done by ra-
tionalizing development in or near low-income neighbor-
hoods as creating employment opportunities close to
work. The lack of attention to low- or mid-wage jobs in
these types of developments results in tangible gaps in
terms of wage, job security, social position, wealth, edu-
cation, and quality of life (Scott, 2006). High-skilled work-
ers migrate to areas when the local workforce is unable
to fill the demand for high-skilled jobs. This inflow mi-
gration of high-skilled professionals helps the high-tech
economy grow and allows high-tech job opportunities to
continuously emerge, while a higher portion of the origi-
nal low-wage, unskilled residents might not have the op-
portunity to move into the high-skilled professional cate-
gory. A shrinking middle class increases the gap between
these two classes and deepens the social division of la-
bor caused by the lack of equity in distribution of oppor-
tunities (McCann, 2007). Equity warnings related to pro-
growth local development policies is not a new concern.
Back in the early 1990s, Bartik (1991) discussed the dis-
tributional issues of economic development policies and
pointed to their disregard in practice.
Economic segregation in US regions is positively asso-
ciated with a stronger high-tech industry, higher percent-
age of a creative class workforce and college grads, and
innovation intensity led by knowledge clusters (Berkes &
Gaetani, 2019; Florida & Mellander, 2016). For instance,
in Austin’s creative city-region, the high-technology sec-
tor grew in the late 1990s and, over time, contributed to
an income gap between the creative professionals and
the city’s poor, many of whom are African American and
Latinx (McCann, 2007). During the 1990s, 13.1% of the
city’s populationwas living in poverty comparedwith the
US average of 12.7%. Furthermore, in this period, the av-
erage wage in the high-tech sector increased by $26,500.
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Table 1. Summary of literature synthesis.
Empirical Study
Negative Theoretical (Supportive of/Contradicting the Negative
Consequence Study Author(s) Author(s) Consequence) Finding Summary
Polarized Labor Scott (2006);
Peck (2005);
Donegan &
Lowe (2008)
Berkes & (Supportive) Innovation intensity led by knowledge
Division Gaetani (2019) clusters is responsible for 20% increase in the city’s
segregation between 1990 and 2010.
Florida & (Supportive) Economic segregation in US regions is
Mellander (2016) positively associated with stronger high-tech industry
and creative class workforce.
McCann, (2007) Supportive: In Austin the gap between high-tech
workers and other industries has increasing led to a
wider gap.
Housing Donegan &
Lowe (2008);
Bevilacqua,
Pizzimenti, and
Maione (2020);
Voith &
Wachter (2009);
Catungal &
Leslie (2009)
Florida (2017); (Supportive) Gentrification between 2000 and 2007
Unaffordability positively correlates with the concentration of
high-tech industries, share of science and technology
workers, and artistic and cultural activities across
US metros.
Grodach, Foster, (Contradicting) Not all creative industries play a
and Murdoch (2018) significant role in gentrification and displacement in
the US. Growth of fine and commercial arts
establishments are weakest in gentrifying
US neighborhoods.
Unequal Access Scott (2006); Weinreich, Hamidi, (Supportive) Dallas, TX experienced a strong job
to Opportunities Gouldner (1979) Bonakdar, Sardari, growth as the result of attracting high-tech
and Moazzeni (2019) industries; however, only 4% of Dallas’ residents
who live in the transit dependent core have access to
regional jobs via transit.
Socio-Spatial Scott (2001, 2006) McCann (2007) (Supportive) The victims of housing unaffordability
Polarization and the wage gap in Austin are members of mostly
African American and Latinx communities who
moved out of the high-tech clusters.
Zlolniski, (2006) Supportive: Spatial colonies of low-wage Mexican
workers in Silicon Valley, a major global tech hub,
where there exists an increasing number of workers
in unstable and low-paid status.
Modai-Snir & (Supportive) Integration in global economy and use
van Ham (2018) of IIUD for urban developments to attract high-tech
jobs and talented workers played a major role in
intensifying the socio-spatial divide in Tel Aviv
metropolitan area.
The average rise in wages for all industries, including
high-tech, was only $18,000—a growth in line with the
US average (McCann, 2007).
4.2. Negative Consequence 2: Housing Unaffordability
Housing unaffordability, gentrification, and displace-
ment are points of tension related to urban develop-
ment for their tangible impact on local residents (Voith &
Wachter, 2009). The siting of innovation-related activity
in the city contributes to the problem by creating oppor-
tunities only for high-skilled workers who can afford to
live in close proximity to these jobs.
The place-based strategies that aim to attract high-
tech firms have led to the significant role of real es-
tate development companies in satisfying the strong
demand for urban transformations (Bevilacqua et al.,
2020). This urban transformation is tied strongly to
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place-based amenity richness (McCann, 2007). Such
amenity richness fosters an elevated quality of life that
attracts the creative class, while also increasing hous-
ing prices. Disadvantaged populations are removed in
order to make place attractive for capital (Catungal &
Leslie, 2009; McCann, 2007) and the extensive intro-
duction of place-quality amenities into these neighbor-
hoods have become the standard descriptors to be ap-
preciated by the high-skilled professionals who can af-
ford it. Since the demand side is fulfilled, the increase
in housing price continues (Fingleton, 2008). Urban real
estate frameworks, such as the ones by Alonso (1964),
Roback (1982), and Rosen (1974), explain the spatial
equilibrium dynamic causing this negative consequence
as such: Improvements to an urban area in the form of
a rise of high-wage jobs and the extensive injection of
place-quality amenities, all else equal, causes a demand
increase. If the supply function does not change, then
the equilibriumpricewill increase as a function ofmarket
clearing. As the result of this dynamic, local residents and
renters will be priced out of the market. Without an ade-
quate pre-growthmanagement agenda in place, price in-
crease will not stop due to this supply-demand dynamic.
Empirical evidence in the US also supports the fact
that gentrification (defined as the share of neighbor-
hoods in a region that escalated from the bottom half
to the top half in distribution of home prices between
2000 and 2007) positively correlates with the concentra-
tion of high-tech industries, share of science and tech-
nology workers, and artistic and cultural activities across
USmetros (Florida, 2017). The initial plans for the Boston
Seaport InnovationDistrict (BSID),whichwas launched in
2010 following the 2008/9 recession as Mayor Menino’s
initiative for the South Boston Waterfront, included the
provision of affordable housing units. However, with
the uptick of the rental market in the South Boston
Waterfront, these aims were discarded (Drucker et al.,
2019). Rather than build the 20% required affordable
housing into new developments, contracted developers
were given permission to contribute money into a fund
for development of affordable housing units elsewhere.
Even the lack of affordable housing for high-skilled pro-
fessionals is problematic and can lead to what Florida
(2017) has called the ‘flight of the creative class.’ Dublin,
which has witnessed a post-crash revival due in part to
the expansion of the tech sector with large companies
such as Google, Facebook, Airbnb, and many others lo-
cated in the city center, is facing a housing affordability
crisis across all income classes (Kayanan & Pajević, 2020).
4.3. Negative Consequence 3: Unequal Access to
Opportunities
Without pre-growthmanagement strategies in place, the
growth of the high-tech economy in the city can result
in negative impacts for communities at a regional scale.
Local decision makers working to foster a local knowl-
edge economy by attracting high-tech firms through
tax abatements often negate to consider—or outwardly
disregard—potential future negative consequences of
their decisions at larger scales (Stiglitz, 2016). The con-
centration of urban amenities and economic growth in a
designated urban area that is exclusive to the highly edu-
cated members of society could result in what Gouldner
(1979) first called ‘the dark side of the dialectic’ and later
Scott (2006) explained as the ‘source of localized compet-
itive advantage.’
Several high-tech clusters suffer from the lack of re-
gional planning to provide a pre-growth agendamatched
with accurate infrastructural capacities (Downs, 2005). In
the case of Austin, the high-tech boom led to inequal-
ity, traffic congestion, urban sprawl, and environmen-
tal issues. The same issues are now raised in Dallas-
Fort Worth Motorplex in North Texas, where cities of-
fered ample tax incentives and are heavily focused on
local place-based strategies to attract high-tech firms
(Zandiatashbar, Hamidi, & Foster, 2019). Despite in-
creases in job opportunities, a recent study shows how
transit-dependent populations in Dallas do not benefit
from this growth due to congestion increase and lack of
supportive transit access (Weinreich, Hamidi, Bonakdar,
Sardari, & Moazzeni, 2019). Silicon Valley, which is the
prime model for innovation-based economic prosperity,
has the fifthworst congestion in theworld (Pishue, 2017).
Housing shortage and ongoing transportation challenges
constrain the growth of the Bay Area. While average
monthly housing costs and apartment rental rates in
the Bay Area are the highest in the nation, proximity
to high-tech clusters exacerbate challenges to housing
affordability. Workers locate further from employment
centers and, due to the lack of enhanced regional mul-
timodal mobility amenities, congestion grows. The in-
creased commute times of Silicon Valley workers has re-
sulted in an estimated $2.7 billion yearly loss in produc-
tivity (Joint Venture Silicon Valley, 2019).
4.4. Negative Consequence 4: Socio-Spatial Polarization
The polarized division of labor caused by the concentra-
tion of high wage jobs in IIUDs where housing unafford-
ability deters middle- and low-income households will
result in uneven urban and regional economic develop-
ment. One outcome of this uneven regional growth is
the spatial concentration of low-wage workers in more
affordable, mostly suburban areas (Scott, 2006). In sev-
eral cases, local residents who face the negative con-
sequences of the creative economy are also members
of racially disadvantaged communities. Ample evidence
shows that themembers of raciallymarginalized commu-
nities tend to collocate with members of similar racial
and socio-economic status (White, 1983). For instance,
the victims of housing unaffordability and the wage gap
in Austin are members of mostly African American and
Latinx communitieswhomoved out of the high-tech clus-
ters (McCann, 2007). This is also evident in the spatial
colonies of low-wage Mexican workers in Silicon Valley,
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where there exists an increasing number of workers in
unstable and low-paid status (Zlolniski, 2006). Several
subcontracting agencies hire low-wageworkers for entry-
level custodial jobs comprised mostly of low-wage and
undocumented Mexican immigrant workers (Zlolniski,
2006). In both the Austin and Silicon Valley cases, low-
waged unskilledworkers tend to cluster on affordable pe-
ripheries, which ultimately form the poor spatial patches
in these high-tech regions.
5. Empirical Analysis of the Four Negative
Consequences in Three US Cases
We adopted a quasi-experimental research design to as-
sess the four negative consequences discussed above.
Our focuswas onwhether implementation of IIUDs could
result in an increased share of high-wage jobs, thus
resulting in housing unaffordability, unequal access to
opportunities, and income inequality (Osei & Winters,
2018). Our assessment needed to pair two neighbor-
hoods: one within the territory of the IIUD with one out-
side of it. These neighborhoods needed to share similar-
ities prior to the implementation of the IIUD and have
significantly different outcomes after implementation of
the IIUD in terms of the shares of high-wage jobs, hous-
ing and rent values, and income diversity. This was done
through utilizing the PSM technique. PSM pairs any lo-
cation (census block group) in the affected area by the
IIUD (within a 1-mile buffer of IIUD boundary) with the
most similar location outside of the affected area using
the characteristics explained in Table 2. We conducted
three PSMs, one for each case, including a series of
variables to control for location and socioeconomic at-
tributes of census block groups prior to the implementa-
tion of each respective IIUD. The PSM was implemented
in Stata 16 using the PSmatch2 package and a caliber
(maximum permitted difference between matched sub-
jects) of 0.25 based on ample recommendation in the lit-
erature (Cochran & Rubin, 1973). Once pairing through
PSM was completed, we calculated the ATE of IIUD on
share of high-wage jobs, housing and rent value, and in-
come diversity in 2018 to assess whether the share of
high-wage jobs increases as the result of the IIUD, thus
triggering housing unaffordability and income inequality.
Our study area for each IIUD is their hosting counties
(BSID is in Suffolk county, Cortex is in St. Louis county,
and BNMC is in Erie county). Our PSM analyses matched
treated neighborhoods by IIUD with exactly similar con-
trol neighborhoods. First, we used Principal Component
Analysis (PCA) to develop a measure of socio-economic
status attributes of neighborhoods in 2000 composed
of % of residents with college or higher degree, % of
employed working age residents, and income per capita.
The results of these PCAs are reported in Table 3 and we
used comp. 1 for our PSM analysis.
Second, we matched the treated neighborhoods by
the IIUD (within a 1-mile distance from the designated
area) based on the socio-economic status measures and
distance to the Central Business District. We selected the
Central Business District for two reasons: 1) to ensure
both treated and control neighborhoods are similar in
terms of access to the market core, and 2) in all three
cases, IIUD areas are adjacent to the Central Business
District which could make our comparisons biased. Then
ATE analysis between the treated and control neighbor-
hoods shows the impact of the IIUD on housing unaf-
Table 2. Descriptions and sources of model variables.
Variable Definition Source
Outcome variables:
assessed in 2018 after
the implementation
of the IIUD
High Wage % Percentage of high wage jobs (with earnings US Census Bureau (2017)
greater than $3333/month) in 2017
Housing_Value Median housing value US Census Bureau (2018)
Rent Median rent value US Census Bureau (2018)
Inc_Div1 Income diversity was measured using Simpson’s US Census Bureau (2018)
Index of Diversity of four consolidated census
income categories: low income (US$0 to 24.9k),
low middle income (US$25k to 59.9k), high
middle income (US$60k to 99.9k) and high
income (above US$100k) households
Matching variables:
pre-IIUD; matching
IIUD neighborhoods
with non-IIUD
neighborhoods in 2000
Clg % % of residents with college degree and higher Census (2000)
Income Income per capita in 2000 Census (2000)
Emp % % of employed residents Census (2000)
CBD-Dist Distance to the closest Central Business District Hamidi (2015)
Notes: 1 We used the Simpson (1949) method for measuring diversity which is as follows: Simpson’s Index of Diversity = 1 − ∑k (n/N)
2;
n = Number of residents of particular category per block group; N = Total number of residents per block group; The index varies from
0 to 1, with higher values indicating higher diversity.
Urban Planning, 2020, Volume 5, Issue 3, Pages 378–391 385
Table 3. PCA results for socio-economic status single combined measure.
Components Eigenvalue Emp % Clg % Income # of Observations
BSID Comp. 1 1.87 0.42 0.64 0.65 603
Comp. 2 0.81 0.90 −0.33 −0.27
Comp. 3 0.32 0.05 0.70 −0.72
Cortex Comp. 1 2.16 0.51 0.56 0.62 353
Comp. 2 0.60 0.85 −0.47 −0.25
Comp. 3 0.24 0.14 0.65 −0.74
BNMC Comp. 1 2.12 0.49 0.60 0.63 726
Comp. 2 0.67 0.86 −0.45 −0.23
Comp. 3 0.21 0.14 0.66 −0.74
fordability and income inequality. Table 4 provides the
results of ATE, analyzing the impacts of the IIUD in our
three cases. BSID and Cortex demonstrate a higher in-
crease in housing unaffordability and income inequality.
This could be associated with the growth of high-wage
jobs and high-income households. For instance, on aver-
Table 4. Results of post PSM ATE analysis, IIUD Impact on housing unaffordability and income inequality in 2018.
Avg. Standard # of Paired Outcome
Pair Type Value Difference Error T-Statistics P-Value Observations Variable Name
BSID Treated %48.78
%5.02 4.75 1.16 0.140 72 % of High-Wage Jobs
Control %43.75
Treated %47.37
%11.57 4.98 2.32 0.002** 72
% of High Income
Control %35.80 Households (HHs)
Treated 0.58 −0.02 0.02 −0.72 0.312 72 Income Diversity
Control 0.6
Treated 646.11
182.08 90.82 2.00 0.005** 72
Median Housing
Control 464.03 Value (in 000)
Treated 1680.44
146.28 158.12 0.93 0.255 72 Median Rent
Control 1534.15
Cortex Treated %34.63
%4.72 4.28 1.20 0.236 30 % of High-Wage Jobs
Control %29.92
Treated %39.2
%5.54 7.75 0.72 0.435 30 % of High Income HHs
Control %33.66
Treated 0.57 −0.02 0.04 −0.47 0.617 30 Income Diversity
Control 0.59
Treated 208.05
60.18 36.53 1.65 0.089* 30
Median Housing
Control 147.87 Value (in 000)
Treated 875.27
10.13 65.33 0.16 0.865 30 Median Rent
Control 865.13
BNMC Treated %30.92 −%1.42 9.48 −0.15 0.798 25 % of High-Wage Jobs
Control %32.34
Treated %8.16
%1.49 3.26 0.46 0.544 25 % of High Income HHs
Control %6.67
Treated 0.65
0.04 0.06 0.67 0.183 25 Income Diversity
Control 0.61
Treated 108.3
35.70 39.96 0.89 0.138 25
Median Housing
Control 72.6 Value (in 000)
Treated 760.32
58.24 72.98 0.80 0.205 25 Median Rent
Control 702.80
Note: * P-Value < 0.1; ** P-Value < 0.01.
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age, nearly half of the households in the selected neigh-
borhood geographically affected by the IIUD designation
command a high-income and half of the total jobs are
high-wage. On the contrary, on average, almost only a
third of the households in the control neighborhood out-
side of the IIUD have such high annual income.
Once the IIUD neighborhoods attract more affluent
households, income inequality increases. This could ex-
plain the nearly 14% increase in housing value (on av-
erage). This trend also had an impact on rent growth,
while it appeared to be insignificant according to the ob-
served P-value. We observed almost a similar pattern in
Cortex, however not as significant as in Boston and quite
different than in Buffalo. Boston is an example of a re-
gion needing active controlling policies for smart growth
management. What is striking is that in Boston the gap
is not between the IIUD (Boston’s Seaport Innovation
District) and the neighborhoods far from the IIUD, but
that it is actually within the adjacent neighborhoodswith
shared similar socio-economic attributes prior to the im-
plementation. This demonstrates the strength of the im-
pact of the IIUD. The area of the BSID, as a result of the
IIUD, has become more polarized and homogenous with
more affluent residents earning higher incomes. Due in
large part to its historical legacy with Route 128, its prox-
imity to Cambridge, and the high clustering of univer-
sities and research centers, Boston has a long history
of courting high-tech industries and science and tech-
nology research (Saxenian, 1996), thus differing signifi-
cantly to St. Louis and Buffalo. In this respect, as evi-
dent in Silicon Valley, Vancouver, London and the many
other city-regions with a strong knowledge economy,
Boston’s long-standing shift towards a knowledge econ-
omy may explain the significant differences in variables
across cases (Scott, 2006). However, this only furthers the
argument on the importance of considering the negative
consequences of IIUDs. To date, BSID is no longer consid-
ered an innovation district, meaning that the original in-
tentions to build a space to catalyze regional growth by
fostering a knowledge economy fell secondary to build-
ing a high-income neighborhood (Drucker et al., 2019).
6. Concluding Thoughts and Policy Direction
Emergent place-based strategies aiming to support a
growing and robust knowledge economy, such as inno-
vation districts, innovation hubs, and innovation zones,
have gained in popularity amongst policy makers, plan-
ners, and local urban decision makers. Despite this pop-
ularity, there have been scant studies addressing poten-
tial negative consequences associated with such place-
based strategies. In this article we address the rise of
IIUDs and their connection to place. We argue that while
achieving a strong and prosperous economy is a principle
goal of economic developers, these local actors need to
be equipped with studies that detail the negative conse-
quences of IIUDs to inform pre-growth agendas andmax-
imize inclusive growth within their jurisdictions.
The use of IIUD strategies is quickly and uncritically
spreading to cities across the globe. As discussed above,
scholars and practitioners depend on knowledge-based
industries to grownational employment, Gross Domestic
Product, and innovation and this influences regional and
local economic development planning efforts (Drucker
et al., 2019; L. F. Katz & Krueger, 2016). In an effort to
attract capital investment and human capital, IIUDs are
based within a locality though they also function at a
global level. While this is not unusual in the contempo-
rary global era, what is important to recognize is how
IIUDs may fail to address local needs as well as the sec-
toral differences between knowledge-based businesses
(Zandiatashbar, Hamidi, & Foster, 2019). Therefore, IIUDs
need to include policies focused on local residents as a
way to control for the increased polarized division of la-
bor, housing unaffordability, unequal access to opportu-
nities, and socio-spatial polarization that we found to be
the potential negative consequences of IIUDs.
As IIUDs trend, this study is certain to be the first
of many. In this last section, while recognizing the need
and urgency for increased research, we discuss a few
policy directions to curtail the negative consequences
of IIUDs. For instance, local advocate-driven leadership
coalitions considering IIUD strategies can create partner-
ships with a wide range of actors to better inform devel-
opment decisions. In addition to the standard represen-
tatives from high-tech firms, universities, hospitals, and
the city’s or region’s official decision makers, IIUD coali-
tions can also include local residents, NGOs, and social
justice activists. Collectively, the coalitions define the vi-
sion and pillars for IIUDs, overseeing the associated poli-
cies and developments, advocating for empowering lo-
cal residents through social equity, inclusiveness, and re-
sources to train local residents to participate in the high-
tech job market.
As we show, IIUD strategies result in the spatial clus-
tering of more affluent residents. In Boston, for instance,
we observed that implementation of the IIUD led to a
spatial core of high-tech high-wage jobs with a lower in-
come diversification. Therefore, diversification of IIUDs
should push beyond social, racial, and gender diversity
to also focus on economic diversification of industrial ac-
tivities and specializations. Diverse specializations could
support social inclusion, lifelong learning, and robust
R&D activities (Niebuhr, 2010). Studies show that indus-
tries have different location behavior: While design and
consulting firms are drawn to more walkable and transit
accessible neighborhoods, advance manufacturing sec-
tors are drawn to areaswith strong auto-accessibility and
proximity to airports (Zandiatashbar, Hamidi, & Foster,
2019). Hence, this economic diversification can also bal-
ance the needs for both active and non-active mobility
facilities and support better accessibility.
Rising housing prices as the result of the implementa-
tion of IIUDs is amajor concern in the literature.While in-
creased polarized division of labor and income inequality
was not consistent across our three empirical cases, the
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rise of housing value was a common outcome of IIUD in
our three cases. This calls for a strong focus on affordable
housing within the IIUD, as well as in the neighborhoods
surrounding it. However, this concept needs to merge
with empowering local entrepreneurship. Multifamily
rental properties in tech-hub cores are a better alter-
native to single-family homeownership assistance pro-
grams. Such properties allocate better access to jobs,
while development of single-family houses in the urban
core contribute to sprawl and congestion. Existing af-
fordable housing policies could includemixed-residential
and retail/office properties with retail or office uses
to support owners’ or renters’ entrepreneurial activi-
ties. Including affordable office spaces in such mixed-
use developments could support high-tech startup ac-
tivities while affordable retail space could sustain other
economic activities that do not necessary require tech-
based training. Implementing service amenities such as
workforce development hubs, educational institutions,
andworkforce training opportunities in easy proximity to
affordable housing residents is key.
As housing and land value inflation is capturing too
much of the value of IIUDs, policymakers need to revisit
and reserve the Land Value Taxation in IIUDs for mitigat-
ing the negative consequences of IIUDs. It is not only
the tech businesses who could benefit from the IIUDs,
but also large capital windfalls would go to landown-
ers, as the result of attracting high-wage high-tech jobs,
many of whom, according to Mulgon (2019), have con-
tributed little to the wealth they capture. Hence, what
is essentially needed in IIUDs is a novel approach to cap-
turing land value gains within cities to divert them into
new sources for mitigating the potential negative conse-
quences of IIUDs.
In summary, though the Coronavirus pandemic of
2020 might recalibrate our understanding and role of
cities, for the foreseeable future, IIUDs strategies will
continue to reshape the socio-spatial demographic of the
city. What we aim to demonstrate here is that an eco-
nomic development practice increasingly attuned to and
deriving profit from place has a responsibility to remain
sensitive to its local residents. By first demonstrating the
negative consequences associated with IIUDs and then
pointing to possible policies to mitigate them, this arti-
cle is a first step in the process.
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